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ABSTRACT. Since Hume, philosophers of induction have debated the question of 
whether we have any reason for assuming that nature is uniform. This debate has always 
presumed that the uniformity hypothesis itself coherent. In Part 1 of the following I
argue that a proper appreciation of Nelson Goodman's so-called grue-green problem 1
should lead us to the conclusion that the uniformity hypothesis, under its usual inter- 
pretation as a strictly ontological thesis, is incoherent. In Part 2 I argue that further 
consideration of the grue-green problem leads to the conclusion that certain popular 
versions of the thesis of physical supervenience/the primacy of physics, under their usual 
interpretation as strictly ontological theses, are false. In Part 3 I argue that the notions 
of natural kinds and nature's joints should not be taken as ontologically objective 
notions but as interest relative. Together Parts 1, 2, and 3 provide support for the 
Nietzsche-Goodman thesis that philosophers are prone to mistakenly identify as ab- 
solute, mind and language independent, features of the world which are in fact only 
features of a particular discourse, or of the world relative to a particular discourse. 
1. THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE: A REFUTATION 
1.1. The Rejection of Unrestricted Uniformity Hypotheses 
The following three statements are logically inconsistent: 
(1) All emeralds are green. 
(2) All emeralds are grue. 2 
(3) Some emeralds will exist after the year 2000 AD.  
Presumably,  at the present ime, (3) and the following two statements 
have, and deserve to have, a high credibil ity for both reader and 
author: 
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(4) All of the many observed emeralds have been green (at the 
time of observation). 
(5) No emerald has yet been examined after the year 2000 AD. 
(4) and (5) together entail: 
(6) All of the many observed emeralds have been grue (at the 
time of observation). 
Let us then assume, as seems reasonable, that we are justified in 
believing (3), (4), (5) and (6). 
Now if we were to accept and act in accordance with the rough, 
unrestricted rule: 
(R1) Assume the future will be like the past 
or its more precise counterpart 
(R2) From (i) All observed As are B 
infer (ii) All As are B. 
we would find ourselves in the contradictory position of affirming (1), 
(2) and (3), that is, the contradictory position of affirming that some 
emerald existing after the year 2000 AD is both wholly blue and 
wholly green. 
We are, of course, strongly inclined to reject the inference from (6) 
to (2). Contra (R1), we are not willing to accept the claim that in 
respect of grueness the future will always be like the past. Contra 
(R2), where 'grue' takes the place of 'B' we are not (always) willing to 
accept the inference from (i)to (ii). Our resistance to the inference 
from (6) to (2) shows that we are not willing to accept and follow the 
unrestricted rules (R1) and (R2). 
1.2. Hume's Uniformity Hypothesis, a Revision and Defeated Defense 
Hume, for one, thought hat Our normal inductive inferences could be 
(shown to be) justified if we had epistemic access to (i.e., good reason 
for believing) the hypothesis that the future will be like the past: that 
nature is uniform. Moreover, Hume claimed there is a tacit assump- 
tion of the truth of this hypothesis that underlies our natural presump- 
tion of the reasonableness of our inductive practices. Thus in the 
Enquiry Hume says 
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. . .  all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will 
resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible 
qualities. I f  there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the 
past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to 
no inference or conclusion)  
And in another place he writes that 
. . .  all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition that the course of 
nature will continue uniformly the same. 4
Nor was Hume alone in making this claim. For instance Mill in one of 
the seminal texts of inductive logic writes 
•. .  the proposition that the course of nature is uniform is the fundamental  principle, or 
general axiom of induction. 5 
Notoriously, Hume went on to question the legitimacy of our in- 
ductive practices by questioning this supposed tacit assumption. 
Hume questioned the legitimacy of inductive inferences by posing 
the following type of question: what reason, if any, do we have for 
assuming that the course of events will not change, that the future will 
not be radically different from the past? Yet, as we saw above, this 
assumption, inasmuch as it represents a commitment to (R1) and/or 
(R2), is not an assumption we are willing to endorse. In fact, with 
respect o grueness we do not expect hat the course of events will not 
change. In respect of grueness we do believe that the future, or at 
least that part of it occurring after 2000 AD, will be radically different 
from the past. While we believe that for any past time t any emerald 
existing at t was grue at t, we do not believe that for any future time t 
any emerald existing at t will be grue at t. We expect that after the 
year 2000 AD emeralds will "change" from grue to bleen. 
Now perhaps we might attempt to subvert this criticism of the 
uniformity hypothesis by claiming that (R1) and (R2) are here being 
taken too literally. Thus we can imagine a would-be objector arguing 
as follows: certainly we do not expect he future to be like the past in 
all respects. Nor did anyone, including Hume, ever think that we did. 
Thus Hume was presumably aware that we are not willing to infer 
such conclusions as 'All emeralds have been observed' from such 
premises as 'All observed emeralds have been observed'. Neverthe- 
less, in most respects we expect the future to be like the past. Thus 
(R1), for instance, is best understood as short-hand for: 
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(R3) Assume that the future will, by and large, be like the past. 
That we do not expect he future to be like the past in regard to some 
respects, such as grueness, does not count against (R3). 
As it stands this attempted defense of the uniformity hypothesis will 
not work. The problem is that there are an infinite number of respects 
in regard to which the future will not resemble the past and in regard 
to which we do not expect he future to resemble the past. Indeed for 
any arbitrary predicate P in regard to which we expect he future to 
be like the past we may construct a predicate P' in regard to which we 
do not expect the future to be like the past. Thus we define P' as 
follows: 
x is P' at time t = df, 
x is P and t < 200 AD, or, 
x is not P and t >i 2000 AD. 
Thus there are at least as many respects, or at least as many predi- 
cates, 6in regar d to which we expect he future to differ from the past 
as there are respects, or predicates, in regard to which we expect he 
future to be like the past. Yet save that we believe that the future by 
and large will be like the past we have no reason to accept (R3). The 
natural understanding of 'by and large' here is in the sense of 'in most 
respects'. By this interpretation (R3) is prima facie unacceptable. 
1.3. Real Change and Nominal Change, Properties and Uniformity 
Recall that earlier I wrote of our expectation that emeralds will 
"change" from grue to bleen after 2000 AD. Here it might be 
objected that so-called change from grue to bleen after the year 2000 
AD is no real change, for underlying this nominal change is a 
persistence in real color, namely a persistence in greenness. According 
to this objection it is change from, for instance, green to blue that 
constitutes real change of color. 
However, against his it may equally be objected that that so-called 
change from green to blue after the year 2000 AD is no real change, 
for underlying this nominal change is a persistence in real color, 
namely a persistence in grueness. 
Certainly the sceptical, anti-metaphysical, empiricist Hume could 
not provide the philosophical framework to sustain the first claim over 
THE WORLD IN  ITSELF  305 
the second. However, others of a less exacting nature might be willing 
to invoke recondite ntities in order to achieve this effect. Thus, those 
who are willing to include properties or natural kinds in their ontology 
might claim that 'grue' and 'bleen' do not name real color proper- 
ties/natural kinds, while 'green' and 'blue' do. Combining this with the 
claim that real change involves a change of properties/natural kinds, 
they will conclude that "change" from grue to bleen at the year 2000 
AD does not constitute a real change. 
Developing this line, it might be claimed that (R1), (R2) and (R3) 
above all involve implicit reference to the notion of uniformity of 
properties/natural kinds. Thus it may be argued that they are all in fact 
shorthand for: 
(R4) Assume that the future will, in respect of real proper- 
ties/natural kinds, be, by and large, like the past. 
Now even granting this somewhat baroque ontology of proper- 
ties/natural kinds, the uniformity hypothesis still highly questionable. 
After all, if it is grue-type-predicates rather than green-type-predi- 
cates that name properties/natural kinds, then presumably the future 
will not, by and large, be like the past in respect of real proper- 
ties/natural kinds. How then are we to know, indeed what if any 
reason do the partisans of properties/natural kinds have for believing, 
that green-type-predicates rather than grue-type-predicates name 
properties/natural kinds? 
The adherents of properties/natural kinds have merely swapped an 
ontological problem for an epistemological problem. By assuming that 
only certain predicates name properties/natural kinds and that real 
change involves change of properties/natural kinds, they have pro-  
vided a framework in which one can make sense of the claim that the 
future will, by and large, be like the past. However they have given no 
reason to believe that that claim even embodies our actual expec- 
tations, for instance, our expectation that emeralds will remain green 
after the year 2000 AD. If it is 'grue' and grue-like predicates, rather 
than 'green' and green-like predicates, that name properties/natural 
kinds, then the claim that in respect of properties/natural kinds the 
future will be, by and large, like the past, contradicts our actual 
expectations - for instance our expectation that all future emeralds 
will be green. 
For the moment we will disregard the properties/natural kinds 
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response. In Part 3 below I argue that one of the traditional reasons 
for positing natural kinds is misguided. 
1.4. Real Change, Microstructure and Observationality 
Those who still intuit that predicates such as 'green' and 'blue' "limn 
the true structure of the universe" and that predicates such as 'grue' 
and 'bleen' are mere Menschenwerk might be tempted by either or 
both of the following attempted defenses of that intuition. 
First, it might be claimed that change from green to blue at 2000 
AD constitutes a real change, while change from grue to bleen at 
2000 AD does not, because the former involves an accompanying 
microstructural change while the latter does not. 
This claim meets with the objection that along with grue-type- 
predicates for describing macroscopic phenomena there are also grue- 
type-predicates for describing microstructural phenomena, nd hence 
that microstructural change is at least as problematical s "real color 
change". 
Suppose that anything that is green has a type X microstructure 
whereas anything that is blue has a type Y microstructure. Then let us 
define type greX and type bl Y microstructure asfollows: 
w has type greX microstructure at time t = df. (w has type 
X microstructure and t< 2000 AD) or (w has type Y 
microstructure and t/> 2000 AD). 
w has type blY microstructure at time t = df. (w has type Y 
microstructure and t<2000 AD) or (w has X micro- 
structure and t ~> 2000 AD). 
While something that changes from green to blue at the year 2000 AD 
changes from having microstructure X to having microstructure Y,
something that changes from grue to bleen at the year 2000 AD 
changes from having microstructure greX to having microstructure 
bl Y. Now we have no reason for believing that change from micro- 
structure X to microstructure Y constitutes real microstructural 
change while change from microstructure greX to microstructure bl Y 
does not. Thus even admitting the premise that real change involves 
some accompanying microstructural change still gives us no reason for 
believing that change from green to blue constitutes real change while 
change from grue to bleen does not. 
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Second, it might be claimed - indeed, it has been claimed 7 - that 
predicates such as 'blue' and 'green', unlike such predicates as 'grue' 
and 'bleen', "limn the true structure of reality", or at least are 
appropriate predicates for use in inductive inferences, because they 
are ostensively definable predicates. 8 
One problem with this claim is that any predicate can be defined by 
ostensive definition. A predicate is ostensively definable for individual 
x if x could be taught its correct usage through the non-verbal 
indication of positive and negative instances. Now it is true that fo r  
typical humans 'green' may be grasped through ostensive definition 
whereas 'grue' may not be so grasped. Yet consider the case of an 
individual who is such that at the year 2000 AD he will undergo 
certain physiological changes o that after 2000 AD blue things will 
affect him as green things did before the year 2000 AD and green 
things will affect him as blue things did before 2000 AD. For instance, 
after 2000 AD blue things cause him to have qualitatively the same 
visual impressions as green things typically produced in him before 
2000 AD. For such an individual 'grue' is ostensive!y learnable while 
'green' is not so learnable. 9 
Of course, it might be claimed that predicates such as 'green', rather 
than predicates such as 'grue', limn the true structure of the universe 
because they are ostensively learnable for us. Yet, since what is 
ostensively learnable for us is partially a function of our own phy- 
siological make-up, this raises the question: why should our physiology 
have a purchase on the structure of the universe? This matter will be 
further dealt with in Part 3 below. 
1.5. The Moral: Change is Relative 
Rather than motivating ontological indulgences or other evasive 
manoeuvres, I believe the lesson to be learned from Goodman's 
grue-green problem is that the notion of real or absolute change 
should be dispensed with. In its place we must learn to make do with 
the notion of relative change. We have already learned to abandon the 
notion of absolute change of motion and position in favor of frame-of- 
reference-dependent notions of change of motion and position. We 
must now learn to live with the notion of frame-of-reference-depen- 
dent change of color, size, shape, microstructure or any other respect. 
There is no absolute fact about when an individual changes its 
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position, shape, motion or color. Change is always relative to a frame 
of reference. 
Usually frames of reference are incorporated into predicate struc- 
tures. Thus relative to our normal structure of color predicates (which 
includes 'red', 'blue', 'green', etc., but not 'grue') an object X which is 
green before 2000 AD and thereafter green is an object that has not 
undergone color change, whereas an object Y that is green before 
2000 AD and thereafter blue is one that has undergone color change. 
However, relative to a color structure which includes 'grue' and 
'bleen', but not 'blue' or 'green', it is object X that has changed color 
and Y that has not undergone a change of color. 
Hume thought our inductive habits covered a tacit assumption that 
there will be no radical change in the course of nature. Here Hume 
implicitly takes change to be an absolute, non-relative notion. Good- 
man's insight shows that at most our tacit assumption is that with 
respect to our favored frame of reference (Goodman's o-called 
entrenched predicates) we assume the future will be like the past. 
Goodman's insight brings into question the very notion of absolute, 
non-relative change. It is crucial here to realize that Goodman's 
insight is not merely an epistemological insight though Goodman 
himself often stresses its epistemological implications. What is at stake 
is not merely the questions of whether we do believe, and whether we 
have good reason for believing, that nature is, by and large, uniform, 
and that change is an absolute-frame independent fact. The very 
coherence of the uniformity thesis and of the notion of non-relative 
change is being challenged. 
The universe in itself is neither uniform nor non-umform. Rather, it 
is uniform relative to certain frames of reference and non-uniform 
relative to certain other frames of reference. Here then, we have the 
answer to the old question of whether the world is changeless or in 
flux. Relative to certain frames of reference it is changeless; relative to 
others it is in constant flux. 
Thus passes Parmenides' problem. 
2. PHYS ICAL  SUPERVENIENCE:  A REFUTAT ION 
2.1. Further Ramifications: Grue and Supervenience 
Considerations of the above type should not simply lead us to the 
conclusion that change alone is relative to a frame of reference. They 
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should also lead us to conclude that certain related notions, for 
instance the notions of similarity and difference, are also frame-of- 
reference dependent. 1° 
Thus, considered from a frame of reference which includes grue 
color predicates but not our standard color predicates, emerald X 
which is green at 1980 is the same color as emerald Y which is blue at 
2001 (they are both grue), though X is different in color from emerald 
Z which is green at 2001 (X is grue, while Z is bleen). Yet considered 
from a frame of reference which includes our standard color predi- 
cates, but not grue color predicates, emerald X is the same color as Z 
(both are green) and is different from Y as regards color (X is green 
while Y is blue). 
Now if we accept the claim that similarity and difference are 
frame-of-reference d pendent notions we will need to reconsider the 
status of various theses that utilize these notions. One such thesis, as we 
shall soon see, is that of physical supervenience: the thesis that all 
facts/states of affairs supervene upon physical facts/states of affairs, 
that physics is "the ultimate parameter of reality". This is a thesis that 
many physicalists have retreated to after the perceived collapse of 
reductive physicalism (roughly, all facts are reducible to physical facts) 
and token identity (roughly, every thing is identical to some physical 
thing). Thus its relativization has profound implications for what 
remains of the physicalist program. 
2.2. Supervenience and Physically Identical Worlds 
One popular version of the supervenience thesis has it that 
(S) For any two distinct atom-for-atom identical (possible) 
worlds W and W' whatever is true of the one is true of the 
other. 11 
Terence Horgan, for one, canvasses the following version of this type 
of supervenience thesis: 
There do not exist any two P[hysically accessible]-worlds which are exactly alike 
microphysicaUy but which differ in some other respect. 12 
Now suppose that world W 1 is a world containing only one object a 1 
and that object is green, and world W 2 is atom-for-atom identical with 
W 1. Then, by (S), there is a corresponding green object in W2; call it 
object a 2. Let the predicates 'gwue' and 'bween' be defined as follows: 
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x is gwue = dr. x is in W 1 and x is green or x is not in W 1 
and x is blue. 
x is bween -- dr. x is in W 1 and x is blue or x is not in W 1 
and x is green. 
By these definitions a I is gwue and not bween while a 2 is bween and 
not gwue. In other words, though 'contains a gwue object'  is true of 
W 1 and 'contains a bween object'  is not true of W 1, 'contains a gwue 
object'  is not true of W 2 and 'contains a bween object' is. Thus it is 
not the case that whatever is true of world W I is also true of world 
W 2 . 
More generally wherever there are two atom-for-atom identical 
worlds W and W' and P is some predicate true of an object a in W 
and a'  is its counterpart in W', then we may construct predicates P1 
and p2 which are respectively true of a and a', though neither is true 
of both. Thus we define P1 and p2 as follows: 
x is p1 = dr. x is in W and x is P or x is in W' and x is not 
P. 
x i sp2=df .x i s in  W and x is not P or x is in W'andx is  
P. 
Of course if there are no such worlds then the supervenience thesis (S) 
is trivially true. Yet in this case, by the same token, so is the 
anti-supervenience thesis: 
(AS) For any two distinct atom-for-atom identical (possible) 
worlds W and W' it is not the case that whatever is true of 
the one is true of the other. 
Clearly, in this case (S) provides no comfort to the advocates of 
physicalism. The supervenience thesis (S) is either false, or trivially 
true and irrelevant o the concerns of the physicalists. 
At  this point perhaps some readers will be inclined to object that 
predicates uch as 'gwue' and 'bween' are not legitimate predicates. 
Where this intuition exists it is no doubt fueled by the fact that the 
definitions of these terms provided above involve mention of location 
in worlds: the definitions involve what might be called "worldly 
predicates". By the same token, it may be claimed that the advocates 
of the supervenience thesis intend such theses as (S) to be restricted to 
• predicates that do not involve reference to possible worlds - after all it 
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is clearly the case that for any two distinct worlds W and W' there will 
always be some predicate, for instance, 'is W", that is true of the one 
and not the other. Thus, it may be claimed that the supervenience 
thesis (S) is shorthand for the thesis: 
(S*) For any two distinct atom for atom identical (possible) 
worlds W and W' any non-worldly predicate that is true of 
the one is true of the other. 
The problem with (S*) is that it utilizes a supposed istinction between 
non-worldly and worldly predicates. This supposed distinction is in 
fact as difficult to define as is the supposed objective distinction 
between grue and non-grue-like predicates. 
A worldly predicate cannot simply be one that makes explicit 
reference to possible worlds, for our predicates 'gwue' and 'bween' 
make no such reference. Nor can a worldly predicate simply be an 
explicitly worldly predicate or a predicate that is definable in terms of 
explicitly worldly predicates, for in that case every predicate is a 
worldly predicate and hence (S*) is trivially true. For instance, 'green' 
may be defined as follows: 
x is green = dr. x is gwue and x is in W' or x is not in W' x 
is bween. 
Those who seek to defend the supervenience thesis by invoking such 
notions as those of "legitimate predicates" or of "non-worldly predi- 
cates" owe us a substantial nd well motivated theory of predication to 
clarify and justify the use of such notions. Until such an account is 
provided we can make little sense of such supervenience theses as 
(S*). I, for one, do not believe any such theory is forthcoming. 
2.3. Supervenience: No difference without a Physical Difference 
(S) is not the only version of the supervenience thesis. For instance, 
another version has it that 
(S1) There can be no difference/change without a physical 
difference/change. 
Or, as Quine more picturesquely states it: 
Nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, 
without some redistribution of physical states. 13 
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Read in the way I suspect physicalists intend it to be read (S1) is 
simply false. 
Let a be any actual green object that our common garden variety 
physicalist would agree has undergone no physical change from time 
t I through t 2 to t 3. Let us define the predicates 'grue' and 'bleen' as 
follows: 
x i sgrueat  t=df . t<t  2 and x is green or t>/t  2 and x is 
blue. 
x i sb leenand t=df . t<t  2 and x is blue or t1>t 2andx is  
green. 
Now either a changed from green to some other color at t z or it did 
not so change. If it did, then (S1) is false, for ex hypothesi a has 
undergone no physical change, yet (S1) entails that no object can 
undergo such a change of color without going through some physical 
change. If a remained green through t 1 to t 3 then it changed from 
being grue to bleen. Yet again ex hypothesi a has undergone no 
physical change, so in this case too (S1) is false. 
It may be claimed (presumably by an uncommon physicalist) that 
our initial hypothesis that a has undergone no physical change from t 1 
through t a to t 3 is false, on the grounds that, even if relative to our 
normal physical predicates a has undergone no change, relative to 
certain non-standard grue-like physical predicates a has indeed 
undergone change. Thus suppose from t 1 through t2 to t 3 a has atomic 
structure X. Then let us define the predicates 'has atomic structure 
beX'  and 'has atomic structure bl Y' as follows: 
x (at t) has atomic structure beX = dr.  t<  t 2 and x has 
atomic structure X or t>~ t2 and x does not have atomic 
structure X. 
x (at t) has atomic structure bl Y= df .  t < t 2 and x does not 
have atomic structure X or t 1> t 2 and a has atomic struc- 
ture X. 
Then ex hypothesi a has changed from having atomic structure beX 
to having atomic structure bl Y during the period from t 1 to t 3. 
Now if we allow that the change from having atomic structure beX 
to having atomic structure bl Y and other such changes count as 
physical change, then we will hold (S1) to be trivially true, for at all 
times every thing is going through some such physical change relative 
to some such grue-like physical predicate. 
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The supervenience thesis (S1), interpreted in this manner, provides 
no comfort for the physicalist inasmuch as he is an empiricistic realist. 
For such a physicalist wants to argue that while the non-physical, or at 
least the naturalistic non-physical, supervenes upon the physical, the 
physical does not supervene upon the (naturalistic) non-physical. Yet 
given the notion of change implicitly assumed in the above inter- 
pretation of (S1) the physical is supervenient upon the (naturalistic) 
non-physical since each thing is going through some (naturalistic) 
non-physical change relative to some grue-like (naturalistic) non- 
physical predicate. 
2.4. Linguistic Supervenience and The Non-primacy of Physics 
Rather than talking simpliciter of the supervenience of the non- 
physical on the physical, we might perhaps do better to speak of the 
supervenience of certain restricted sets of non-physical predicates on 
certain restricted sets of physical predicates. Thus we might advance 
such limited supervenience theses as 
(cs) There can be no change of application relationships be- 
tween the set of normal color predicates and a world W 
without there being a change of application relationships 
between the set of normal physical predicates and W. 
Yet even if (CS) and a host of similar limited supervenience theses 
were true this would not serve to establish the fabled primacy of the 
physical. For along with such supervenience theses there will be true 
supervenience theses uch as 
(PS) There can be no change of application relationships be- 
tween the set of normal physical predicates and a world W 
without there being a change of application relationships 
between the set of non-normal non-physical predicates and 
W. 
Alternatively, given certain generally restricted vocabularies (e.g., 
vocabularies which include only standard English predicates and the 
predicates of standard physical theory) we might frame such general 
supervenience theses as 
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($2) There can be no change of application relationships be- 
tween a world W and the set of non-physical predicates 
without there also being an accompanying change of ap- 
plication relationships between W and the set of physical 
predicates, though there can be a change of application 
relationships between W and the set of physical predicates 
without here being an accompanying change of application 
relationships between W and the set of (naturalistic) non- 
physical predicates. 
Indeed it may be argued that such restricted theses are what 
sophisticated physicalists had in mind from the beginning. Yet note 
that such restricted theses would need to be seen as as much a 
reflection of the nature and limits of the vocabularies in question as a 
reflection of the nature and limits of the world. 
Supervenience theses provide no safe resting place for even limited, 
non-reductionistic, versions of the physicalist dream, where that 
dream incorporates the notion that from a strictly ontological point of 
view the world is basically a physical world. 
3. NATURAL K INDS,  NATURE'S  JO INTS AND REAL ISM 
No doubt many readers will be suspicious of the predicates, 'grue', 
'bleen', 'microstructure greX', 'microstructure blY', etc., used in the 
above arguments. Such suspicions are, I believe, well motivated. 
Where we must be careful is in our theorizing about why such 
predicates seem so odd. 
Certainly such predicates do not seem to sort out things in any 
perspicuous manner. In other words, they represent ad hoc categories. 
The crucial point to realize, and a point that is nearly always over- 
looked, is that sorfings and categories are not non-perspicuous or ad 
hoc in themselves, rather they are non-perspicuous or ad hoc to 
particular agents or particular types of agents. True, a human agent 
thinking in terms of grue-like predicates might not be able to make 
useful predications. Such an agent might, as Quine strangely puts it, 
"exhibit the pathetic but praiseworthy tendency of dying before he 
reproduces his kind". TM But this is not because he has failed to carve 
nature at its joints or because the kinds he thinks in terms of are not 
natural kinds. It is because those kinds were not useful in predicting 
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change as it occurs for him. To establish this claim I need to introduce 
yet more odd predicates. For this I crave the reader's indulgence. 
Consider an individual who, rather than thinking and inducing in 
terms of our normal predicates, thinks and induces in terms of grue- 
like predicates. For instance, suppose this individual, Joe, to give him 
a name, does not use the term 'strawberry', but uses the term 'paw- 
berry' which we may define as follows: 
x is a pawberry at t =d~ x is a strawberry and t < 2000 AD 
or x is a nightshade berry and t >- 
2000 AD. 
Thus Joe reasons inductively from: 
All observed pawberries have been nutritious 
to :  
All pawberries are nutritious. 
After 2000 AD Joe's chances of survival are presumably drastically 
reduced. But this is not because he fails to think in terms of natural 
kinds or because he does not carve nature at its joints. To see this 
consider the case of an individual, call him Bob, who is such that after 
2000 AD strawberries are poisonous for him whereas nightshade 
berries are nutritious for him. Projecting in terms of 'strawberry' 
would not be conducive to his survival but projecting in terms of 
'pawberry' would be conducive to his survival. It is not the point here 
to object that Bob must have been going through some physiological 
change if strawberries affect him so differently before 2000 AD than 
after. For while it is presumably true that relative to our standard set 
of physiological predicates Bob undergoes change at 2000 AD, this 
does not show that the kind strawberry is natural while the kind 
pawberry is not. After all, by Bob's set of grue predicates ,.'t is we who 
have undergone physiological change and he who has remained the 
same. For Bob, this explains why before 2000 A.D we find pawberries 
nutritious yet after 2000 AD we find pawberries poisonous. 
We need predicates like 'strawberry' not to predict absolute change 
as it occurs in the world. Rather we need such predicates to predict 
change as it occurs for us. The argument offered, for instance, by 
Quine 1~, that our kinds must be natural because otherwise we would 
not be able to predict change and constancy in the world and hence 
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would not be able to survive in the world, misses the point that to 
survive we need only need predict change as it occurs for us. To 
accept that there really is absolute, objective change (that change 
from green to blue at 2000 AD is real objective change, while change 
from grue to bleen at 2000 AD is not) is to presume the very point 
under contention, amely, that there are natural kinds. 
To put the point another way, that certain kinds are useful in 
predicting change as we experience it, does not show that those 
kinds are natural in themselves, but only that they are natural for 
particular agents. That our frames of reference, our predicate struc- 
tures, help us get along in the world as we experience it does not show 
that our frames of reference, our predicate schemas, capture the 
structure of the world. Those who are realists about natural kinds and 
who blithely use the metaphor of cutting nature at its joints should pay 
more heed to the deep adage that "one man's meat is another man's 
poison". Those of us who accept hat our notions of change and of 
kinds merely reflect he world as we experience it need not worry that 
our predicate structure does not capture the structure of the world. 
Only realists who retain the notion of the world complete with natural 
kinds, joints for theories to carve at, and absolute change, need spend 
their time in the, I believe, fruitless pursuit of explaining what is 
objectively wrong with grue-like predicates. 
All this is not to say that those who reject the notions of natural 
kinds, nature's joints, and absolute change need not worry about the 
problem of induction. We may still ask whether the world as we 
experience it will be uniform with respect to our favored set of 
predicates rather than some set of grue-type predicates. 16However, 
we will not have the additional question of whether the world in itself 
is basically uniform, nor will we have the question of whether the 
kinds that are natural to us really carve nature at its joints. We, unlike 
the realist, need not be moved by a sceptic who asks: Even if our 
theories are accurate accounts of the world as we experience it and as 
we will experience it, what, if any, reason do we have for believing 
that our theories are accurate of the experience independent world? 17 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The uniformity of nature thesis and the thesis of physical super- 
venience/the primacy of physics are usually presented as strictly 
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ontological theses. Yet read as strictly ontological theses they must be 
regarded as false if not incoherent, save that one posits occult entities, 
such as properties or natural kinds, in order to explicate them. Further, 
even if we are willing to posit such entities, we will have no reason for 
believing the uniformity thesis or supervenience thesis save that we 
have reason for believing that our favored frames of reference, our 
favored predicate structures, pick out properties or natural kinds. The 
claim that our predicate structures are efficacious in helping us predict 
change as we experience it does not show that our predicate structures 
pick out natural kinds or carve nature at the joints. 
All this, I believe, provides reason for accepting a Goodmanesque 
point of view: In itself the world is neither basically uniform nor 
physical, nor does it contain natural kinds or joints. Relative to 
particular frames of reference the world is uniform; physical features 
are primary; certain kinds are natural, and there are joints for our 
theories to carve at. Yet this tells us as much about the nature and 
limits of the frames of reference in question as it does about the nature 
and limits of the world. Indeed, outside of any frame of reference the 
world has neither nature nor limits. 18 
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